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Abstract 
A new IAM is used to calculate the optimal tradeoff between, on the one hand, 
locking up fossil fuel and curbing global warming, and, on the other hand, 
sacrificing consumption now and in the near future. This IAM uses the Oxford 
carbon cycle, which differs from DICE, FUND and PAGE in that cumulative 
emissions are the key driving force of changes in temperature. We highlight how 
time impatience, intergenerational inequality aversion and expected trend growth 
affect the time paths of the optimal global carbon tax and the optimal amount of 
fossil fuel reserves to leave untapped. We also compare these with the adverse and 
deleterious global warming trajectories that occur if no policy actions are taken. 
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1. Introduction 
Climate scientists have warned that to have a 50-50 chance of limiting global warming 
to not more than 2 degrees Celsius above the average global temperature of pre-
industrial times throughout the twenty-first century cumulative carbon emissions 
between 2011 and 2050 need to be limited to 1,100 gigatonnes of carbon dioxide (Gt 
CO2) or 300 gigatonnes of carbon (GtC) (Allen et al., 2009 Meinshausen et al., 2009; 
Clarke et al., 2014).1 Recent calculations suggest that this necessitates that one third of 
oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over four fifths of coal reserves must remain 
untapped from 2010 to 2050 (McGlade and Ekins, 2015). This study uses an ad-hoc 
combination of the top-down model MAGICC to give a probability distribution of the 
temperature rise trajectories for a given carbon emissions profile taking macroeconomic 
trends as given and the bottom-up model TIAM-UCL to calculate how much of each 
fossil fuel can  be burned in each region.  
The integrated assessment model (IAM) most often used by economists and policy 
makers is DICE (Nordhaus, 2014).2 This general equilibrium IAM has the advantage 
that it can explain macroeconomic trends and changes in the carbon cycle in a coherent 
and consistent manner. However, it supposes that all fossil fuel is abundant and thus 
cannot speak to the key question of how much fossil fuel to abandon in order to limit 
global warming.  
Most IAMs that are used in the policy debate such as PAGE (Tol, 2002ab), FUND 
(Hope, 2006) or DICE are quite complex and difficult to comprehend for the outsider (if 
accessible to the public at all). Furthermore, although figures for the optimal carbon tax 
derived from these IAMs deliver headline-grabbing numbers, it is less clear to the 
uninitiated where these numbers precisely come from and how reliable the underlying 
global damages used in these IAMs are from a scientific point of view (Pindyck, 2013). 
The only IAM that does give estimates of the amount of fossil fuel to be locked up 
(McGlade and Ekins, 2015) does not perform an optimal tradeoff between locking up 
fossil fuel and the resulting curbing of global warming, on the one hand, and 
consumption sacrifices that have to be made to achieve this today and in the near future, 
on the other hand.  
                                                 
1 According to the IPCC (2014), cumulative emissions have to be limited to an uncertainty range of 700-
860 GtC if global warming is to remain below 2°C. With 520 GtC emitted by 2011, this gives a tight 
carbon budget range of 180-320 GtC. 
2 Simulations based on DICE also supported the recommendations of the Stern Review (Stern, 2007). 
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Our objective is to demonstrate how the global carbon tax and the amount of 
unburnable  fossil fuel depend on ethical parameters such as the society’s rate of time 
impatience and intergenerational inequality aversion, the extraction cost technology, the 
rate of technical progress in renewable energy and the estimate of the future trend rate 
of economic growth. We offer back-on-the-envelope rules for the global carbon tax and 
how much fossil fuel to leave unburnt. We do not specify a ceiling for the carbon 
budget, but derive the climate policies that maximize social welfare and optimally trade 
off making sacrifices by current generations and those in the near future to limit global 
warming in the more distant future within a simple and transparent framework.  
To back up our arguments, we put forward a new IAM of macroeconomic growth and 
climate change with three features that are not present in the DICE, FUND or PAGE 
models (Rezai and van der Ploeg, 2015). First, we allow extraction costs to increase as 
the finite stock of fossil fuel reserves is depleted. This creates a scarcity rent on fossil 
fuel and a motive not to burn all available reserves. Second, existing IAMs have used 
rather simple carbon cycles on coarse time grids with the implication that the amount 
that is left of burning one ton of carbon today at any future is independent of past or 
current stocks of carbon in the atmosphere. Others have shown that the carbon cycle of 
DICE can be well represented with a two- or three-box carbon cycle (Golosov et al., 
2014; Gerlagh and Liski, 2013), but also abstract from history dependence. The Oxford 
carbon cycle (e.g., Allen et al., 2009) does give a role for memory and captures the 
carbon cycle and temperature changes much better and we therefore use this as our 
carbon cycle. For this cycle cumulative carbon emissions are the main driving force of 
changes in global mean temperature and this is why we focus on cumulative emissions 
too. Third, our IAM optimally determines the time at which fossil fuel is phased out and 
renewable energy is phased in. The transition to the carbon-free phase occurs at the 
moment that the rise in extraction costs as reserves are depleted plus the rise in the 
social cost of carbon together with the fall in the cost of renewable energy are 
sufficiently strong to price fossil fuel out of the market. Our IAM has a finer, annual 
grid than other IAMs so the timing of energy transitions can be pinpointed more 
precisely. 
Other features of our IAM are more familiar. We have a Ramsey model of 
macroeconomic growth and convergence with capital, labor and energy fuel as factors 
of production, use the global warming damages of DICE, and suppose that renewable 
 
 
4 
 
energy is not competitive today but will become so in the future as technical progress 
reduces their cost while the cost of fossil fuel increases with cumulative extraction. 
Overall technological progress proceeds along its historic average of roughly 2% per 
annum and world population continues to grow to a plateau of 12 billion. We will 
highlight the importance of different expectations about future trend growth for climate 
policy in our simulations.  
 
2. Some simple insights into optimal climate policy 
A simple rule for the optimal global carbon tax τ  (in dollars per ton of emitted carbon) 
at time t is (e.g., Golosov et al., 2014; Gerlagh and Liski, 2014; Rezai and van der 
Ploeg, 2014) ( ) ( ) ( ), '( ) 0,t r Y t rτ χ= Ω Ω <  where 0.002379χ =  is the damage flow as 
a fraction of world GDP corresponding to burning one gigatonne of carbon, Y is world 
GDP, and r  is the growth-corrected rate used to discount global warming damages. 
With global warming damages proportional to world GDP (roughly as in DICE), the 
optimal global carbon tax is proportional to world GDP too. The function ( )rΩ
corresponds to the present discounted values of what is left at each point of time in the 
future of burning one ton of carbon today, suitably corrected for the lag between 
changes in the stock of atmospheric carbon and global mean temperature. This captures 
the DICE carbon cycle fairly well, but for the Oxford carbon cycle the history of 
emissions matters and thus the optimal global carbon tax should be written as 
(1) ( )( ) , ( ) ( ), '( ) 0,t r H t Y t rτ χ= Ω Ω <   
where ( )H t  denotes the history of fossil fuel emissions at time t. The insight that the 
optimal global carbon tax is proportional to world GDP and decreases with the growth-
corrected interest rate is thus unaffected. In economic growth models, the standard 
Keynes-Ramsey rule gives the growth-corrected social rate of interest 
(2) ( 1) ,r RTI IIA g= + −  
where 0RTI >  is the rate of time impatience, 0IIA ≥  the coefficient of relative 
intergenerational inequality aversion and g is the rate of trend growth. If there is little 
concern for the welfare of future generations (high RTI ), the interest rate will be high 
and the global carbon tax low as future damages are discounted more heavily. Provided 
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1,IIA >  growth implies that future generations are richer and thus that current 
generations are less prepared to make sacrifices to curb global warming in the distant 
future especially if intergenerational inequality aversion is strong. Higher growth then 
leads to a higher social rate of interest and to a lower carbon tax. 
The cost of extracting fossil fuel increases as fewer reserves are left, so that the easiest 
accessible resources are explored first. Extraction cost at time t is thus ( )( ) ,C S t ' 0,C <  
where ( )S t  denotes reserves at time t. The optimal amount of fossil fuel to be locked up 
at the end of the fossil fuel phase follows from the condition that the marginal cost of 
fossil fuel extraction plus the carbon tax must equal the cost of renewable energy, since 
at the time of the energy transition, say T, the scarcity rent of fossil fuel vanishes. 
Hence, ( )( ) ( ) ( ), 0,C S T T b T Tξτ+ = >  where 0ξ >  denotes the carbon emission per 
unity of energy (the emission intensity) and ( )b t  the unit cost of infinitely elastically 
supplied renewable energy at time t. Using the functional specification 
( ) ( ) 10( ) (0) / ( )C S t S S t
γγ=  together with (1) and (2), we derive the amount of unburnt 
fossil fuel as a function of fundamental ethical, technological and geophysical 
parameters: 
(3) 
( )
11
11
0 0( ) .
(0) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 1) , ( ) ( )
S T
S b T T b T RTP IIA g H T Y T
γγγ γ
ξτ ξ χ
  
= =     − − Ω + −   
 
Since unburnt fossil fuel increases in the global carbon tax, a lower rate of time 
preference or less intergenerational inequality aversion lowers the rate used to discount 
damages and pushes up the carbon tax and thus leaves more of each fossil fuel unburnt. 
A higher damage coefficient or a higher level of world GDP at the time of the switch to 
the carbon-free era also pushes up the carbon tax, so more of each fossil fuel is left in 
the ground. Also, more of a fossil fuel is left unburnt if the cost of extracting ( 0γ ) are 
high and the cost of its carbon-free alternative ( ( )b T ) is low. Further, more fossil fuel is 
left unburnt if the emissions intensity (ξ ) is large.3 To the extent that solar energy is a 
cheap substitute for coal in, say, electricity generation, more of coal reserves must be 
                                                 
3 For example, the tar sands are expensive and have a high emissions intensity so it is best to keep as 
much (if not all) of these reserves unexploited. Conventional natural gas and shale gas are relatively 
cheap to extract and have lower emissions intensity than oil, coal or tar sands. This suggests that much 
less of gas reserves should be abandoned. Coal is very cheap to extract and has relatively high emissions 
intensity, so much of coal reserves will be used unless carbon is properly priced. 
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left unused. The stock of untapped fossil fuel indicates how much fossil fuel is burned 
which translates into cumulative carbon emissions. It thus follows that cumulative 
emissions and global warming are curbed if the rate of time impatience (RTI), 
intergenerational inequality aversion (IIA) and (if  IIA > 1) trend growth are lower, 
extracting fossil fuel is more expensive and renewable energy is cheaper. Finally, if σ
units of fossil fuel are needed per unit of output, the optimal time of the energy 
transition is approximately 
(4) 0 0
( ) ( )1 ln 1 , 0, , 0.
(0) (0)
S S T S S TT g g T g
g Y Yσ σ
 − −
= + ≠ = = 
 
 
Equation (4) shows that fossil fuel is abandoned more quickly if the economy and the 
associated demand for fossil fuel ( (0)Yσ ) are large, the total amount of burnt fossil fuel 
( 0 ( )S S T− ) is small, and the rate of economic growth ( g ) is high. Using (3), we see 
that a higher weight to the welfare of future generations (lower RTI ) and less 
intergenerational inequality aversion (lower in IIA ) lowers the amount of burnt fossil 
fuel and thus speeds up the transition to the carbon-free economy. 
  
3. Policy simulations 
To demonstrate the robustness of the insights obtained from (1)-(4), we present 
simulations for the optimal carbon tax and the business-as-usual (BAU) outcomes from 
our general equilibrium IAM with stock-dependent extraction costs, optimal energy 
transitions and Oxford carbon dynamics. In the baseline simulations we assume that the 
RTI is 0.1% per annum (Stern, 2007), IIA  is 1.45 (Nordhaus, 2014) and productivity 
growth is 2% per annum (Barro, 2014). Table 1 presents these numbers and also a set of 
four sensitivity runs in which we analyse the effect of changes in the key parameters 
appearing in (1)-(4). We also present a ‘conventional’ scenario which meets the 
standard assumptions economists make about the social rate of time impatience, the 
degree of intergenerational inequality aversion, and the trend growth rate of 
productivity. Figure 1 reports the equilibrium trajectories for select key variables for the 
welfare-maximizing case (left panel) and BAU where no policy action is taken, i.e., the 
carbon tax remains at zero (right panel).  
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Key Baseline (RTI = 0.1%, IIA = 1, g = 2%) yields rapid decarbonization mid-century, limiting global 
warming to slightly above 2°C. Conventional economic parameters (RTI = 1%, IIA = 2, g = 2%) delay 
the transition by one decade and lead to temperature increases of 3°C. 
Figure 1: Sensitivity analysis for the optimal SCC and cumulative emissions 
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Key: Business-as-usual leads consistently to high temperature deviations of 5°C. Only lower expected 
growth in living standards reduces cumulative demand for fossil fuel. 
 
Figure 1 (cont’d): Sensitivity analysis for the optimal SCC and cumulative emissions 
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We start with BAU (right panel) to illustrate the disastrous prospects for the world and 
highlight the need for climate policy. Without a carbon tax, firms are not forced to 
internalize the deleterious effects of fossil fuel and the market price of fossil fuel is 
sufficiently low for continued use of the dirty but cheaper input for most of the century. 
In the baseline BAU case 4,760 GtC are burnt and global temperature peaks above 5 °C. 
This is in sharp contrast with the social optimum where only an eighth as much carbon 
is burnt and temperature peaks slightly above 2°C (see discussion below). What is more, 
a maximal warming of 5°C and cumulative carbon emissions in excess of 4,500 GtC are 
a consistent feature of all our BAU simulations, regardless of the degree of RTI and IIA 
as these parameters mostly influence the carbon tax (which is zero in BAU). The trend 
growth rate does have a significant impact on BAU, but only on the timing of fossil fuel 
use in (4). As the economy grows more slowly, less fossil fuel is used in each period. 
This pushes out the time at which the economy switches to the carbon-free phase and 
allows technological progress in renewable energy generation to continue. Peak 
temperature is, however, only slightly lowered with cumulative emissions of about 
4,000 GtC, which is still more than 10 times the carbon budget compatible with keeping 
global warming below 2 degrees Celsius. Given our simulations, BAU clearly is not an 
environmentally viable option. Fortunately, it is also very unattractive from a purely 
economic point of view not to adopt climate policy. 
Optimal climate policy responds to the tradeoff between, on the one hand, locking up 
fossil fuel and curbing global warming, and, on the other hand, sacrificing consumption 
now and in the near future and, abstracting from the collective actions problems vexing 
current climate negotiations, suggests that welfare is maximized under a complete 
decarbonisation of the economy by mid century in the baseline scenario (red, solid) or 
by 2070 at the latest in our sensitivity runs. The left panel in figure 1 illustrates that in 
the base line the optimal carbon tax is set to limit global warming to 2.2°C, starting at 
$82/tC and rising at about 3% per annum over the next two centuries. Stringent climate 
policy of this form increases the price of fossil fuels rapidly enough that fossil fuel is 
phased out and carbon-free alternatives are phased in mid-century. At this point, 
cumulative emissions amounting to 670 GtC will have been burnt and all remaining 
fossil fuel reserves will be abandoned. This favorable scenario contrasts starkly with the 
business-as-usual case discussed above.  
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Scenario Color RTI IIA g r Cumulative emissions 
Maximum 
temperature 
Baseline  0.1% 1.45 2% 1% 670 GtC 2.2 °C 
Lower IIA  0.1% 1 2% 0.1% 30 GtC 1.2 °C 
Lower trend 
growth  0.1% 1.45 1% 0.55% 440 GtC 1.9 °C 
Higher 
Discounting  1% 1.45 2% 1.9% 1,010 GtC 2.6 °C 
Conventional  1% 2 2% 3% 1,430 GtC 3 °C 
 
Table 1: Policy Scenarios, equilibrium interest rates, and cumulative emissions 
Given the assumptions about ,RTI IIA  and ,g  we can compute the equilibrium interest 
rate in (1). For the baseline scenario, r is 1% per annum. The rules in (1) and (2) allow 
us to predict the effects of changes in parameter values on the optimal carbon tax, 
cumulative emissions, and peak temperature. Increasing the RTI  to 1% per annum 
increases the interest rate with which damages are discounted from 1% to 1.9% per 
annum and, consequentially, lowers the carbon tax. Fossil fuel therefore remains 
competitive for longer, leading to increased cumulative emissions and higher peak 
warming. The simulations in figure 1 confirm this prediction, with the initial tax falling 
to $45/tC, cumulative emissions and maximal warming rising to 1,010 GtC and 2.6°C, 
respectively.  
Figure 1 also reports the effect of lowering the degree of intergenerational inequality 
aversion to 1. This reduces the social interest rate r to 0.1% per annum, and therefore 
increases the carbon tax (to $408/tC), curbs cumulative emissions (to 30 GtC) and 
lowers global warming (to 1.2°C). More pessimism about future growth prospects, say, 
lowering g to 1%, roughly halves the social interest rate which leads to a near doubling 
of the initial carbon tax to $153/tC but also flattens the growth trajectory of the carbon 
tax (to roughly 2% per annum). The overall effect is still a reduction in cumulative 
emissions to 440 GtC and of peak temperature to 1.9°C.   
We also report the outcomes for what we deem the ‘conventional’ parameter set in the 
economics profession (e.g., Weitzman, 2007). In the presence of positive productivity 
growth, the higher discount rate and the higher degree intergenerational aversion lead to 
a significantly higher interest rate of 3% per annum. The economic intuition behind this 
is that with a lower RTI  and higher ,IIA  current generations are less willing to sacrifice 
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their own economic well-being which is at a lower level than that of future generations 
which are expected to be significantly wealthier due to persistent growth in productivity 
and living standards. The higher social interest rate lowers the carbon tax to $22/tC as 
future damages are discounted more heavily. The price of fossil fuel remains below that 
of renewable energy for longer and cumulative emissions increase to 1,430 GtC, 
inducing temperature to peak at 3°C.  
 
4. Conclusions 
The failure of markets to price carbon emissions appropriately leads to excessive fuel 
use and global warming. Climate policy corrects this planetary market failure and 
imposes the social cost of deleterious carbon emissions on the users of fossil fuel by 
levying a global carbon tax (or setting up a market for tradable emission permits), 
thereby limiting cumulative carbon emissions. Most of climate economics tries to 
calculate the social cost of carbon, or the optimal carbon tax, using large, intransparent 
numerical IAMs, which are unable to shed light on the optimal amount of fossil fuel to 
leave unburnt. We have given some simple formulae to show how the global carbon tax 
and the amount of untapped fossil fuel can be calculated on the back-on-the-envelope 
given estimates of society’s rate of time impatience and intergenerational inequality 
aversion, the extraction cost technology, the rate of technical progress in renewable 
energy and the future trend rate of economic growth.  
Our numerical general equilibrium IAM with stock-dependent extraction costs, 
endogenous energy transitions and Oxford carbon dynamics shows that with business as 
usual global warming leads to unacceptable degrees of peak global warming, around 
5°C. This highlights the urgency and scale of the climate policy challenge. Our 
estimates of the optimal time paths for the carbon tax significantly curb cumulative 
fossil fuel use to 670 GtC. As a consequence, peak temperature reduces to 2.2°C in our 
baseline scenario but ranges between 1.2°C and 3°C across scenarios with cumulative 
emissions ranging from 30 to 1430 GtC. Climate policy is more ambitious if future 
generations get more weight, intergenerational inequality aversion is less, and the 
expected trend rate of economic growth is lower. The optimal carbon tax is proportional 
to world GDP so that future development in the productive capacity of the economy is a 
crucial driver of the optimal carbon tax. 
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In as far as our optimal climate policy based on the DICE estimates of global warming 
damages lead to more than 2°C global warming more climate adjustments need to be 
made. An obvious one is that a rising carbon tax will in itself increase the rate of 
technical progress in renewable energy production and speed up the transition away 
from fossil fuel. To the extent that there is learning by doing, a renewable energy 
subsidy is called for (Rezai and Van der Ploeg, 2014). Another one is that a rising 
carbon tax induces additional carbon capture and sequestration. This may well be an 
essential component of assuring that global warming remains below 2°C (Allen et al., 
2009).  
A crucial research question is how markets will respond to a 2°C world with stringent 
climate policy. In the absence of viable sequestration options, cumulative emissions of 
300-670 GtC should be compared with existing reserves of the 7 big international oil 
companies. Carbon Tracker and The Guardian have highlighted the issue in a recent 
fossil disinvestment campaign.1 However, any economic disconnect between the 
planetary carbon budget constraint and existing reserves depends on the current book 
value of these reserves. We believe that contemporary accounting practices are guarding 
against an artificial overvaluation of international oil companies and it does not seem 
appropriate to warn about stranded assets of oil companies. However, we leave this for 
future research and conclude that, notwithstanding, the planet should get used to the 
idea that large chunks of fossil fuel reserves should remain untapped. 
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Appendix 
Our IAM is effectively the one presented in Rezai and van der Ploeg (2015), but with 
the Oxford carbon cycle instead of the carbon cycle of DICE or Golosov et al. (2014). 
The economic part of our IAM is calibrated to data for 2010: world GDP is 63 trillion 
US $, the initial capital stock is 150 trillion US $ and initial energy use is 9.44 GtCe. 
The world population is 6.5 billion in 2010 and is assumed to rise to 10 billion at the 
end of the century and to stabilize at 12 billion. We assume a depreciation rate for 
capital of 10% per annum and a Cobb-Douglas technology with 30% and 70% as the 
shares of capital and labor, respectively. We assume that for each trillion of output that 
is produced 0.15σ =  GtC of fossil fuel is needed, which is in line with a Leontief 
technology. The initial cost of renewable energy (0)b  is initially $800/tCe. The rate of 
technical progress in renewable energy is initially 1% per annum and then slows down 
to 0.5% per annum during the first 50 years  and to below 0.1% per annum in 150 years. 
The cost function for oil extraction has $350/tC 0( 0.35)γ = which gives the share of 
energy in output of about 5%. Extraction costs evolve with 1 0.5γ = and the initial 
stock of fossil fuel reserves is 10,000 GtC. This means that initially renewable energy is 
more than twice as expensive as fossil energy. Since we measure fossil fuel use in GtC, 
the emissions intensity is  1.ξ =  
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